基于等值线约束的地磁匹配定位技术

地磁匹配定位是利用地磁图进行定位的方法,位置输出可用于限制惯导系统的误差积累.介绍了地磁辅助导航的原理和发展现状,并重点研究了地磁匹配定位技术.提出了一种基于等值线约束的改进的相关匹配算法,能有效消除导航系统的初始位置误差并能限制匹配过程中惯导系统的积累误差.仿真实验证明该算法能有效地提高相关匹配的实时性,并能把定位精度控制在地磁数据网格间距以内.算法对航向误差具有一定的适应性.     

大椭圆停泊轨道月球探测器发射窗口运动学约束特性分析及转移轨道快速设计方法

通过分析大椭圆停泊轨道月球探测器发射窗口的运动学约束特性,给出了转移轨道运动学约束对发射窗口的影响规律,进一步明确了在该种情况下月球探测器的发射机会和增加窗口的可能性.并结合发射窗口运动学约束特性,提出了一种基于大椭圆停泊轨道的地月转移轨道快速设计方法.仿真结果验证了大椭圆停泊轨道下探测器发射窗口运动学约束特性分析的正确性,以及转移轨道设计方法的有效性.     

雷达干扰资源一对多分配方法

在对雷达干扰资源分配的一般优化模型和求解算法进行分析的基础上,从提高资源利用效率的角度出发,提出了目标雷达分群思想,并建立了一种新的基于一对多策略的雷达干扰资源分配模型,通过对目标雷达群的一对一分配实现对单部雷达的一对多分配.最后,对该模型中一些关键性问题进行了探讨,如任务整合、新任务参数确定、任务优先级排序、干扰机位置部署以及单目标雷达群干扰效益评估等.     

Dynamic inventory management with cash flow constraints

In this article, we consider a classic dynamic inventory control problem of a self‐financing retailer who periodically replenishes its stock from a supplier and sells it to the market. The replenishment decisions of the retailer are constrained by cash flow, which is updated periodically following purchasing and sales in each period. Excess demand in each period is lost when insufficient inventory is in stock. The retailer's objective is to maximize its expected terminal wealth at the end of the planning horizon. We characterize the optimal inventory control policy and present a simple algorithm for computing the optimal policies for each period. Conditions are identified under which the optimal control policies are identical across periods. We also present comparative statics results on the optimal control policy. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2008     

加强约束的布尔可满足硬件求解器

利用现场可编程门阵列固有的并行性和灵活性,提出在硬件可编程平台上基于随机局部搜索算法的布尔可满足性求解器,用于求解大规模的布尔可满足性问题。相对其他求解器,该求解器的预处理技术能极大提高求解效率;其变元加强策略避免了同一变元被反复连续翻转,降低了搜索陷入局部最优的可能。评估结果表明,求解器最多能处理32 000个变元/128 000个子句的实例。相比当前同类型的求解器,其求解效率明显提高。     

具有终端角度约束的H_∞制导律设计

针对导弹对地面运动目标精确攻击时姿态约束的H_∞末制导问题,提出了一种新的具有终端角度约束的制导律.基于二维弹目相对运动学的非线性关系,并将目标机动运动和系统结构摄动作为外部的扰动,建立了垂直平面内弹目相对运动的数学模型.以命中点终端姿态角跟踪误差和控制能量最小为性能指标,同时基于零化弹目视线角速率的思想, 设计得到了非线性H_∞鲁棒制导律.该方法利用Lyapunov稳定理论严格证明了制导系统的全局渐近稳定性,而非求解HJI偏微分方程,同时也避免了对剩余时间的估计.数字仿真表明这种制导律在不需要任何目标运动信息的情况下,仍然保证终端角度和制导精度的要求,具有很强的鲁棒性和适应性.     

Resource rents,institutions, and violent civil conflicts

Natural resources have been blamed for inducing slow growth and sparking civil conflicts and violence. This paper first develops a model to account for the hazard of armed civil conflicts as a manifestation of the natural resource curse, which is mediated by the quality of both economic and political institutions. We then use recently published data on institutional quality and natural resource rents to measure the potential impact of the resource curse on violent civil conflicts using a panel of data for over 100 countries in the period 1970–2010. Our model explicitly accounts for the role of good economic and political institutions in deterring the recourse to violence as well as the extent to which they might weaken the resource rents effect.     

异构资源类型下多无人机任务分配

针对多无人机在执行侦察、打击任务的过程中携带任务资源的异构性,以及任务对于异构资源的要求,设计了一种改进的基于共识的捆绑算法(consensus-based bundle algorithm, CBBA)。考虑任务价值、任务执行时间窗以及航程代价等条件建立了多无人机对地目标侦察、打击任务分配模型。利用K-medoids聚类分析方法对多无人机进行基于距离和携带资源平衡的聚类,以解决多无人机对于异构资源类型的要求。对打击任务进行子任务生成,并利用改进后的CBBA求解所建立的任务分配模型,通过对比仿真实验验证了算法的可行性和有效性。     

Technical note: Find a hidden “treasure”

This paper deals with a two searchers game and it investigates the problem of how the possibility of finding a hidden object simultaneously by players influences their behavior. Namely, we consider the following two‐sided allocation non‐zero‐sum game on an integer interval [1,n]. Two teams (Player 1 and 2) want to find an immobile object (say, a treasure) hidden at one of n points. Each point i ∈ [1,n] is characterized by a detection parameter λ_i (μ_i) for Player 1 (Player 2) such that p_i(1 ? exp(?λ_ix_i)) (p_i(1 ? exp(?μ_iy_i))) is the probability that Player 1 (Player 2) discovers the hidden object with amount of search effort x_i (y_i) applied at point i where p_i ∈ (0,1) is the probability that the object is hidden at point i. Player 1 (Player 2) undertakes the search by allocating the total amount of effort X(Y). The payoff for Player 1 (Player 2) is 1 if he detects the object but his opponent does not. If both players detect the object they can share it proportionally and even can pay some share to an umpire who takes care that the players do not cheat each other, namely Player 1 gets q₁ and Player 2 gets q₂ where q₁ + q₂ ≤ 1. The Nash equilibrium of this game is found and numerical examples are given. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Constrained minimax optimization of continuous search efforts for the detection of a stationary target

Analytical resolution of search theory problems, as formalized by B.O. Koopman, may be applied with some model extension to various resource management issues. However, a fundamental prerequisite is the knowledge of the prior target density. Though this assumption has the definite advantage of simplicity, its drawback is clearly that target reactivity is not taken into account. As a preliminary step towards reactive target study stands the problem of resource planning under a min–max game context. This paper is related to Nakai's work about the game planning of resources for the detection of a stationary target. However, this initial problem is extended by adding new and more general constraints, allowing a more realistic modeling of the target and searcher behaviors. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007